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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
MORNINGSIDE CHURCH, INC. v. RUTLEDGE1
In a case involving a Missouri televangelist, a purported
COVID-19 cure, and state officials from Arkansas and California,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s
dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Jim Bakker is the lead pastor at Morningside Church in
Stone County, Missouri and the host of the Jim Bakker Show—a
nationally broadcast television program produced in conjunction
with Morningside Church and Morningside Church Productions
(collectively, “Morningside”). Bakker is a resident of Stone
County, and both Morningside entities are headquartered there.
In February 2020, Bakker began advertising a product
named “Silver Solution” on the Jim Bakker Show as a “proven”
COVID-19 remedy. This attracted scrutiny from law enforcement
officials across the country. Los Angeles, California City
Attorney Mike Feuer; Arkansas Attorney General Leslie
Rutledge; Merced County, California District Attorney Kimberly
Lewis; and San Joaquin County, California District Attorney Tori
Verber Salazar opened investigations into Bakker’s
advertisements for potential violations of California’s false
advertising law, Arkansas’s deceptive trade practices law, and
California’s Business and Professions Code, respectively.
Bakker and Morningside filed suit against the four officials
in the Western District of Missouri, alleging the investigations
violated their constitutional rights and that the relevant state
statutes were unconstitutional. The district court dismissed for
lack of personal jurisdiction. Morningside appealed.
Reviewing the decision de novo, the Eighth Circuit reasoned
that due process requires a defendant have minimum contacts
with a forum state for that state to exercise specific personal
jurisdiction. The court then enumerated the Eighth Circuit’s five1. Morningside Church, Inc. v. Rutledge, 9 F.4th 615 (8th Cir. 2021).
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factor test to assess the sufficiency of a defendant’s contacts: “(1)
the nature and quality of contacts with the forum state; (2) the
quantity of such contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action to
the contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a
forum for its residents; and (5) [the] convenience of the parties.”2
The court additionally evaluated specific jurisdiction using
the ‘effects test’ set forth in Calder v. Jones,3 which extends
specific personal jurisdiction to nonresident defendants who
commit intentional torts when their effects are “felt primarily
within the forum state.”4 The contacts that Bakker and
Morningside alleged were sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction over the defendants in the Western District of
Missouri were the letters and telephone calls that the defendants
had directed toward them requesting information related to the
Silver Solution advertisements.
Using the five-factor test, the court held that the first two
factors in this instance “weigh[ed] heavily against personal
jurisdiction.”5 It reasoned that the communications at issue
occurred in Missouri merely because Bakker lived there and
Morningside was headquartered there; therefore, Bakker and
Morningside were “the only link between defendant[s] and the
forum.”6 The court likewise held that the third factor disfavored
personal jurisdiction, as the communications failed to
demonstrate contacts with the forum itself. Regarding the fourth
and fifth “less important” factors, the court held that “while
Missouri has an interest in establishing a forum for its residents,
that forum is an inconvenient one for the defendants, who are not
from Missouri and have no business in the state.”7

2. Id. at 619 (quoting Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. FedNat Holding Co., 928 F.3d 718,
720 (8th Cir. 2019)).
3. See id. at 620 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)).
4. Id. (citation omitted). Walden v. Fiore refined the effects test, adding two
limitations: (1) the defendant must have created the contacts with the forum state himself;
and (2) the contacts must go to the defendant’s relationship with the forum itself and not
merely to persons who happen to reside there. 571 U.S. 277, 284-85 (2014).
5. Morningside Church, Inc., 9 F.4th at 620-21.
6. Id. at 620 (quotation omitted).
7. Id. at 621 (quoting Whaley v. Esebag, 946 F.3d 447, 453 (8th Cir. 2020)).
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MYERS v. FECHER8
According to this December 2021 decision from the
Arkansas Supreme Court, the Arkansas Freedom of Information
Act (“FOIA”) requires that communications between a state
employee and another on a cloud-based messenger application
that are of a mixed public and private nature must be sorted to
determine which messages qualify as “public records” under the
Act and are therefore “open to inspection and copying.”9
In December 2019, the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette renewed
a 2017 FOIA request seeking correspondence between former
Department of Information Systems (“DIS”) Director Mark
Myers and any representatives of Cisco Systems since January
2015. The requested records included emails, text messages, and
communications saved on Blackberry Messenger, a private, thirdparty cloud-based application. Myers and Jane Doe, an employee
of a technology company that did business with DIS, contested
the release of the three thousand-some-odd Blackberry
Messenger messages on grounds that they were not entirely
public records; rather, they comprised of private, “deeply
personal exchanges, musings and information” unrelated to the
performance of official functions.10
The Democrat-Gazette argued the messages were public
records because they were connected to public business and were
stored on a server belonging to DIS. The circuit court agreed,
stating that “the business and personal matters were so
intertwined that all of the messages were ‘public records[.]’”11
The Arkansas Supreme Court granted a stay of the judgment
pending appeal.
The Court considered two issues on appeal: (1) whether “the
circuit court erred in finding that the [messages] were ‘public
records’ pursuant to FOIA;” and (2) whether “the circuit court
erred in finding that the public interest outweighed privacy
rights.”12 Addressing the first issue, the Court found that:
8. Myers v. Fecher, 2021 Ark. 230, at 1, 635 S.W.3d 495.
9. Id. at 8, 635 S.W.3d at 499 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(a)(1)(A)).
10. Id. at 4, 635 S.W.3d at 497.
11. Id. at 5, 635 S.W.3d at 498.
12. Id. at 6, 635 S.W.3d 498.
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[B]ecause these messages are individual, sent on different
days, and sent at different times, the messages are not all
interrelated and inextricably intertwined as found by the
circuit court. Rather, the messages in this case are capable
of being sorted into private-and public-record
categories. Therefore, the circuit court clearly erred by not
determining whether each individual message met the
definition of a “public record.”13

The Court did not reach Myers and Doe’s remaining
arguments on appeal, and instead, opined that “once the circuit
court has determined which, if any, individual messages are
‘public records,’ Myers and Doe may raise their right-to-privacy
arguments [at which time] the circuit court must conduct the
appropriate weighing test for each item before ordering
disclosure.”14
SLUYTER v. WOOD GUYS, LLC15
The Arkansas Court of Appeals considered the recently
amended mechanics’- and materialmen’s-lien statutes in this
November 2021 decision involving a dispute between
homeowners and a contractor over the refinishing of hardwood
flooring in a private residence.
Aaron and Cheryl Sluyter orally contracted with Wood
Guys, LLC (“Wood Guys”) for the replacement and refinishing
of hardwood flooring in their Rogers home. After Wood Guys
completed the work in March 2019, a dispute arose regarding the
quality of the work performed and the amount owed by the
Sluyters. In response to their refusal to pay the demanded
amount, Wood Guys filed a mechanics’ and materialmen’s lien
on the property and then filed a complaint to foreclose on the lien,
ultimately seeking damages for breach of contract or,
alternatively, recovery under the theory of quantum meruit for
work done on the Sluyters’ property. The Sluyters argued that
Wood Guys was barred from bringing any claims because it did
not provide the necessary preconstruction lien notice.
13. Myers, 2021 Ark. 230, at 11, 635 S.W.3d at 500-01.
14. Id. at 11, 635 S.W.3d at 501.
15. Sluyter v. Wood Guys, LLC, 2021 Ark. App. 442, at 1, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___.
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The circuit court found that Wood Guys was exempt from
the notice requirement under Arkansas Code Annotated § 18-44115 (requiring a “residential contractor” to give preconstruction
lien notice) because it was a “home improvement contractor,” not
a “residential contractor.”16 The court reasoned that the term
“residential contractor” used in §18-44-115 was synonymous
with the term “residential building contractor” defined in
Arkansas Code Annotated § 17-25-502(3). Because the former
term is not defined in the statute, but the latter term is, Wood Guys
did not fall within the definition of a “residential building
contractor.”
On appeal, the court agreed that Wood Guys was not a
residential building contractor but disagreed that the two terms
are interchangeable. The court opted for a broader definition of
residential contractor, opining that Wood Guys was assuredly a
“contractor” as that term is defined in the statute—Wood Guys
directly contracted with the Sluyters, who were owners of a
single-family residence, for the repair and replacement of wood
flooring on the property. “[C]ommon usage of the word
‘residence’ refers to a place or dwelling in which a person or
people live[,]” and the Sluyters’ home certainly fit that
description.17 Ergo, the Court held that Wood Guys was a
residential contractor subject to the statutory requirement to
provide lien notice prior to the commencement of work.
Furthermore, the appellate court agreed with the circuit
court’s finding that Wood Guys was a “home improvement
contractor,” but it held that this characterization barred the
contractor from being a lien claimant under the direct-sale
exception to the notice requirement. This exception provides that
the lien notice requirement does not apply if the transaction is a
direct sale. A direct sale is a transaction in which: (1) “[t]he
property owner orders materials or services from the lien
claimant;” and (2) “[t]he lien claimant is not a home improvement
contractor . . . or a residential building contractor[.]”18 The
appellate court opined that the plain language of the statute
16. Id. at 3, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
17. Id. at 7, ___ S.W.3d at ___.
18. Id., ___ S.W.3d at ___ (emphasis added) (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44115(a)(8)(B)).
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stipulates that a contractor that is a home improvement contractor
may not avail itself of the direct-sale exception. Since Wood
Guys was a home improvement contractor, the preconstructionlien-notice requirement was undisturbed.
At bottom, because Wood Guys was a residential contractor
and a home improvement contractor, it was required to provide
the Sluyters with lien notice prior to commencing the work on the
wood floors in their home under Arkansas Code Annotated § 1844-115(a). Wood Guys did not give notice, so it was barred from
bringing an action to enforce its contractual and quantum meruit
claims.
The Court concluded by noting that the General Assembly
amended the statute in 2021 to remove the bar against equitable
claims for residential contractors who fail to provide
preconstruction lien notice. “While this legislative amendment
comes too late to aid Wood Guys, it now provides a way for
residential contractors to seek redress, even when they fail to
execute and deliver preconstruction lien notice.”19
SILAS HEFFLEY

19. Id. at 9, ___ S.W.3d at ___.

